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ABSTRACT

As both a Working Memory (WM) task and as a more integrated reasoning process,
moral decision making appears susceptible to interference by nociceptive stimuli.
Differentiation, however, between conflicting occupation of WM resources and the influence of
pain-induced autonomic activation as potential pathways of interaction represents a considerably
more difficult task than simple measurement of WM performance. To clarify the basis of any
noted effects, this study recorded both self-report pain intensity and Galvanic Skin Response
(GSR) as a separate measure of autonomic activation under a cold pressor task using a sample of
122 undergraduate participants. Recorded pain and physiological data was compared to rates of
utilitarian decision making in the provided moral dilemmas. While there were significantly lower
rates of utilitarian decision making in the pain condition, a warm-water painless condition
showed comparably decreased rates. Comparison with GSR data suggests that the pain condition
did not induce a significantly heightened state of autonomic activation. This suggests that while
divided attention or occupation of WM resources does effect patterns of moral decision making,
this is not reliant on a nociceptive stimulus.

PAIN AND PRINCIPLE: THE EFFECTS OF NOCICEPTIVE STIMULI
ON MORAL DECISION MAKING
An ongoing goal of research concerning decision making and reasoning in humans,
whether individual, social, or otherwise, is the ability to model and predict the choices of given
individuals in given situations. To this end, considerable effort has been directed towards the
development of models that map and categorize the moral structures and personal variables
thought to be responsible for decision making processes (Crockett, Kurth-Nelson, Siegel, Dayan,
& Dolan ,2014; Gold, Pulford, & Colman, 2015; Greene, 2015; Tang & Tang, 2016) . Since the
inception of the field, the modeling of decision making has spread and diversified to incorporate
biological, social, cultural, and developmental axes of influence. Predictors range from
religiosity to working memory capacity and regularly interact on a degree of complexity that
makes the widespread application of decision making models a challenging pursuit, but several
broad categories of reasoning can be isolated for more targeted study. Of particular interest to
this investigation is the modeling of moral reasoning, both for its potential value in the prediction
of behavior in high stakes decision making and in consideration of the myriad ways in which it is
incorporated into daily cognition.
Conceptual Bases of Morality
Morality concerns the distinction between good and bad, or acceptable and unacceptable,
behavior, with subdivisions regarding the identification, decision making, and motivational
aspects of such. Individual structures of morality have been noted to occupy a wide range of
differentiation, though this is hardly unexpected given the above noted number of influential
factors on decision making in a general sense (Hu, Wang, Pang, Xu, & Guo, 2015; Levine &
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Ramirez, 2013; Pammi, & Srinivasan, 2013; Schöbel, Rieskamp, & Huber, 2016). Perhaps more
telling is the pervasive nature of moral conflict that has characterized both historical and personal
interaction, in which all involved parties feel that they are in the right and that their decision
adheres to expected moral rigor. By definition alone, it should become apparent that morality and
moral influences underlie a great deal of human decision making, particularly in those situations
wherein an individual must make a decision that affects others. As there is often no outcome that
is universally deemed “best” given an ethically charged situation, multiple systems of outcome
prioritization and decision making must be balanced to reach an acceptable choice. One such
differentiation of reasoning modes is the distinction between utilitarian and deontological
decision making, with utilitarian reasoning prioritizing the minimization of overall harm and
maximization of benefits, and deontological reasoning prioritizing adherence to a structured set
of morally guiding rules and expectations (Greene, Morelli, Lowenberg, Nystrom, & Cohen,
2008).
Despite a sizable body of previous and ongoing research on the development and
differentiation of moral reasoning and systems of morality throughout life, comparatively little
research exists investigating the state-based effects on moral reasoning brought about by
physiological or emotional changes in the individual. Existing theories work primarily under the
pretext of morality as a relatively stable, if continually developing, trait-like system of
prioritization and goals (Comunian, 2004; Fleeson, Furr, Jayawickreme, Kohlberg & Lickona,
1976; Meindl, & Helzer, 2014; Jensen, 2008). Whether this is indicative of a belief that moral
decision making is, in fact, largely unaffected by state-based influences or simply a greater
historical concern with the broader patterns of moral reasoning across situations is unclear.
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Regardless, the scarcity of established theories addressing intraindividual fluctuations in moral
decision making is a gap in the literature worth addressing if such fluctuations can account for
the inability to reliably identify higher order moral reasoning in derivatives of Kohlberg’s model,
as post-conventional morality has never been consistently found as a dominant mode of
reasoning (Jensen, 2008). Exemplifying the newer involvement of cognitive-systems
neuroscience in moral reasoning is the Dual Process Theory of Moral Judgement, which models
pathways of utilitarian and deontological reasoning through their respective neural correlates
(Greene et al., 2008).
Neural Bases of Morality
In terms of psychological experimentation, a moral dilemma ultimately relies on the same
regions of processing as any other Working Memory (WM) task. This overlap in associated
neural structures may indicate a neurological avenue by which active emotional or cognitive
processes could influence and be influenced by moral input. As a WM task, the processing of
moral decision making during some of the most commonly used moral dilemmas activates the
same regions of the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex associated with more direct methods of
working memory testing, such as digit span or simple word recall (Harenski, Anonenko, Shane,
& Kiehl, 2010; Moore, Clark, & Kane, 2008). Any task occupying the same cognitive resources
should, in theory, be able to influence the outcomes of a moral decision making task, as limited
resources result in the eventual overload of WM and the subsequent prioritization and
suppression of individual tasks. However, the degree of predictability of these effects are mixed.
In studies examining the effects on working memory and decision making under stress or pain
conditions, it has been shown that, under correct circumstances, the pain stimulus is suppressed
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input, rather than the WM task (Verhoeven et al., 2011). In high pain conditions, performance on
a digit span tasks remained unaffected, indicating specific downregulation of the noxious
stimulus rather than an even split of WM resources. This suggests the involvement of attention in
prioritizing one process, the task being considered, over the other, the perception of pain.
Individual activation of similar prefrontal regions, as well as the top-down suppression of
the noxious stimulus by the active WM task, indicates that both inputs are indeed reliant on
overlapping regions. However, similar studies have shown a negative impact on WM
performance under pain stimuli (Sturgeon et al., 2015). This represents further evidence of a
bidirectional interaction between pain processing and cognitive functions such as decision
making. Though regulated to an extent by attention, it remains plausible that state-based
influences, such as pain, could similarly influence moral decision making should it become the
suppressed task.
Moral reasoning differs from simple digit span or word recall tasks in that it likely
requires the engagement of long-term and semantic memory, as well as developmentally rooted
aspects of personal morality, suggesting increased complexity in terms of how pain may affect
decision making. There exist mnemonic and efficiency techniques in WM training that involve
interplay between working memory and long-term memory for chunking of information into
more manageably processed clusters. These may be comparable to the long-term components of
moral decision making, at least in the possibility that many moral constructs operate under high
efficiency tenants representative of more complex strings of reasoning than can be effectively
applied in snap decisions (Garavan, Kelley, Rosen, Rao, & Stein, 2000; Hempel et al., 2004).
However, the complexity and broad involvement of other regions in moral decision making
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opens the process to other influences on neural circuitry by physiological agents. Pain stimuli, as
a reliable source of autonomic arousal, may have a predictable influence over moral decision
making through sympathetic activation. As sympathetic activation is, by nature, a method by
which the situation can influence decision making by prompting self-preservation behavior, it
seems reasonable to assume that it may have an impact on moral decision making as well.
While it may represent a valuable direction for future research, it should be addressed
that the interest of this study is not the effects of chronic pain on moral decision making or other
WM-reliant processes. The bulk of existing research on the long-term effects of chronic pain on
patients with conditions such as Fibromyalgia indicates a marked loss of cortical thickness and
decreased brain volume with increased rates of depression comorbidity (Chang et al., 2015;
Russell, 2013). These large-scale changes in brain structure, and their associated functional
effects, are not the target interest of this analysis. In theory, should decreased available WM load
have a predictable effect on patterns of moral decision making, it could be hypothesized that
chronic pain patients would respond to moral dilemmas similarly to individuals experiencing
acute pain. However this hypothesis would depend on the degree to which losses in WM
capacity due to cortical atrophy in chronic patients are comparable to the WM capacity “lost” by
an acute stimulus’s WM load.
Predicting Moral Decision Making
Between WM effects and autonomic activation, it appears plausible for a nociceptive
input such as pain to affect the outcome of a morally charged decision. Considerably more
difficult, however, is predicting how the decision will change and what magnitude of influence
pain will ultimately have on an individual's response. With the intent to predict morally driven
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behavior, such behavior must be operationalized along measurable axes. Similar studies using
non-morally charged tasks often rely heavily on accuracy of recall or response time as a measure
of performance, but neither seems to adequately represent a shift in patterns of moral reasoning
as is of interest to this study. Instead, a measure of utilitarian vs. emotional decision making was
used to better reflect the types of behavior that could be functionally applied to comparable
behavior in real scenarios.
Utilitarian decision making reflects a preference towards optimization of outcome, such
as preserving the greatest number of lives regardless of the morally charged actions necessary to
achieve such. Typical moral dilemmas, such as those used by this study, present a scenario in
which the participant must choose whether or not to take an action, or otherwise decides how to
direct a scenario between binary outcomes, with choices graded as either acceptable or
unacceptable. There is no clear “best” outcome, as while one result may preserve the greatest
amount of life, it often requires the sacrifice of others. In this model, utilitarian choices refer to
outcomes in which a participant decides that the survival or minimization of suffering of the
larger population is of higher priority than that of the individual or the few.
The applicability of the potential findings of this line of investigation requires
consideration of the real-world circumstances during which a morally charged decision must be
made under duress or pain. There are several crisis scenarios, as well as their respective
management occupations, during which both pain and high stress must be prepared for. Crisis
situations, broadly including natural or man-made disasters, military combat, home defense,
police work, and personal injury, all represent scenarios in which one or more people must make
a choice in short order and under immediate risk of further pain or personal injury, if not worse.
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All the above situations are also at high likelihood of having a significant moral component
comparable to those specified in the moral dilemmas used in cognitive research. By further
broadening the definition of crisis situation used here to include any situation in which high
autonomic activation can be expected, in tandem with a moral dilemma, scenarios in which fear
or other stimuli may replace pain can also be benefited by a more structured ability to predict
shifts in moral reasoning.
As being unable to determine whether the perceived pain was being suppressed could
limit the degree to which this study could infer the channels by which the nociceptive stimulus
influenced moral decision making, an additional physiological measure, Galvanic Skin
Response, was included in the experiment to help isolate the dominant pathway of influence.
One of the most readily available method of inspecting moral reasoning, remains verbally or
visually presented moral dilemma scenarios such as those discussed above. However, for the
specific purpose of analyzing the interactions between moral reasoning and pain stimuli, this
methodology presents a slight complication. With the simultaneous processing of multiple WM
inputs, it must be taken into serious consideration which task is most likely to be prioritized.
Taking attention as the suggested intermediate of this relationship, the directed attention of the
participant is of paramount importance. Moral dilemmas as presented either visually or verbally
conclude by asking the participant to choose between the presented options, and it is in this
window of consideration that the highest WM load can be expected. Therefore, this is the timeframe in which competing stimuli are most likely to interfere with decision making through
mutual occupation of WM resources, should such interactions indeed occur. The dilemma
becomes that researchers cannot ask participants to both consider the moral dilemma and report
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their current pain experience simultaneously. To do so would direct attention away from the
decision making task and towards the pain stimulus. If the moral dilemma was previously
suppressing the pain stimulus by redirection attention and WM resources, it will no longer be
doing so and the researcher will be unable to record an accurate measure of the pain level while
suppressed of whether the pain stimulus is suppressed at all.
GSR has been shown to reliably predict autonomic activation, with equal or near equal
accuracy as heart rate (Mendes, 2009). In addition, while heart rate measures indicate both
sympathetic and parasympathetic activation, GSR is affected exclusively by sympathetic
pathways. This multi-measure design should allow for a greater degree of differentiation
between cognitive and physiological influences on moral reasoning, as being able to monitor
autonomic activation during the critical periods of decision making when pain reporting cannot
be conducted will grant insight into whether the nociceptive stimulus is being noticeably
suppressed. It was hypothesized that, under the pain condition, utilitarian response rates would
increase due to moral input representing a greater load on WM resources, leading to the
prioritization of utilitarian processing as the system that demands the involvement of fewer
regions of activation.

Methods
Participants
Participants were recruited from the University of North Florida and offered an incentive of
undergraduate extra course credit in exchange for their participation. The sample size totaled 122
undergraduate students, ranging between 18 and 50 years (29% aged between 18-20; 55% aged
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between 21-26; female: 83.6%). Regarding ethnicity, 67% described themselves as
Caucasian/White, 13% as African American, 10% as Hispanic, and 7% as Asian. A slight
majority of participants (58.2%) identified as Christian. The second largest affiliative group was
“No Religious Affiliation”, which comprised 22.8% of the sample.

Materials
Working Memory Test. A standardized working memory test was administered vie
computer to measure working memory capacity using the Alloway Working Memory
Assessment (AWMA-2; Alloway, 2012). All trials began with two on-screen items, increasing
by one item per block, until the participant was unable to recall three correct trials at the
presented block length. There were four trials in each block with the number of correct trials
scored for each participant. The move forward and discontinue rules, as well as the scoring, were
automated by the software.
The Screener version was administered, comprised of one verbal and one visuo-spatial
working memory test. In Processing Letter Recall (verbal working memory), the participant
viewed a letter in red that remained on the computer screen for one second. Another letter in
black immediately followed. Participants verified whether the black letter was the same as the
red letter by clicking on a box marked either ‘Yes’ or ‘No’ on the screen. They then clicked on
the red letters they saw in the presented sequence. Visual working memory was tested using the
Mr. X test. Participants were presented with a picture of two Mr. X figures. They identified
whether the Mr. X with the blue hat was holding the ball in the same hand as the Mr. X with the
yellow hat. The Mr. X with the blue hat was presented in various orientations. At the end of each
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trial, participants were asked to recall the location of each ball in Mr. X’s hand in sequence by
pointing to a picture with eight compass points. Both the Mr. X figures and the compass points
remained on the computer screen until a response is provided (Alloway, 2007).
Moral dilemmas. The study included eight moral dilemma scenarios. All dilemmas
involved killing at least one person in order to save a larger at-risk group. This decision making
process concerned a choice between minimizing harm and maximizing desirable outcomes. A
complete list of the dilemmas can be found at http://www.uncg.edu/#mjkane/memlab.html.
The moral dilemmas were classified as personal/impersonal and self/other. In the
personal/impersonal condition, the participant was provided moral dilemmas graded on degrees
of proximity between the participant and the required action. The personal condition required
participants to take an active role in deciding to kill a person (e.g., pushing a bystander on a train
track) as a means of protecting themselves or an at-risk group. The impersonal condition
required participants decide on a course of action that indirectly resulted in death of an individual
(e.g., door closing, inaction, switch flipping) to save the larger endangered population. There
were four personal dilemmas and four impersonal dilemmas.
In the self/other condition, participants were presented with a moral dilemma that
included a threat to either their person or others. In the self condition, the outcome of the
decision to kill the target resulted in saving oneself as well as others. In the other condition, the
outcome of their decision did not affect their life, only the lives of the endangered population.
There were four self dilemmas and four other dilemmas. After each moral dilemma, the
participant was asked to respond to the moral dilemma aloud with either “1” for “it is appropriate
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to kill” or “2” for “not appropriate to kill” to indicate whether or not it was appropriate to kill in
the given situation.
Cognitive Stress Task. In this condition, the participant was instructed to count
backwards by 6’s, starting from 100 to 0; while listening to a series of moral dilemmas.
Physical Pain Task (cold pressor task). In the physical pain task (cold-pressor task),
the participant placed their dominant hand in a two-gallon plastic bucket of ice water between 0°
– 4° C, (39° F); while listening to a series of moral dilemmas. A physical control condition was
included with warm water heated between 23° – 25° C, (77° F). The warm water was heated by
a small crock pot. For both the cold and warm water conditions, a digital thermometer was used
to assess the ratio of ice water to room temperature water. The order of cold and warm water
conditions were counterbalanced across participants.
Pain Scale. A Numerical Rating Scale (NRS) was used on an 11-point scale ranging
from zero to 10. Participants’ verbally rated their pain level on a scale of zero (no pain) to 10
(worst pain imaginable).
Galvanic Skin Response. GSR data was gathered using AD Instrument Powerlab skin
conductance equipment, including GSR amp and finger electrodes, with a sampling rate of
1K/sec. Recorded data was subsequently cleaned and coded in Chart5 recording software, where
sample means from each condition were gathered for analysis.

Procedure
A cross-sectional design was used to investigate the effects of pain perception on
utilitarian decisions and working memory capacity. The repeated measures design included four
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levels: baseline, cognitive stress task, physical pain task (cold-pressor task), and physical control
task (warm water). The within-subjects factor was the moral dilemmas (personal/impersonal and
self/other).
A total of six research assistants were trained and went through mock procedures before
collecting data. The study was advertised on the university research participation system and
volunteers were recruited over a nine-month period. The criterion for participation was English
as a first language. Participants were given a consent form upon entering the study, which
informed them of the tasks they would be asked to do which included: a working memory test,
answering scenarios as well as “perform some number calculations (like counting backwards in
6’s from 100)” and “to place your hand in ice water and warm water for a short period of time”
and would be indicating how they feel about statements. They were informed of a possible
experience of some slight pain or discomfort from the water task; and if they needed to remove
their hand from the water they would not be penalized.
Next, the moral dilemma scenarios were administered via Qualtrics. All groups received
the baseline and cognitive stressor task before the counterbalanced physical pain (cold) and
(warm) task. In the Baseline condition, the participant only listened and responded to the moral
dilemma scenarios and pain question. In the cognitive stress condition, the participant listened to
the moral dilemma scenarios while counting backwards by 6’s from 100 to zero. In the physical
pain task (cold water) and physical control condition (warm water), the participant listened to the
moral dilemma scenarios while their dominant hand was submerged in the bucket of water. The
water level covered their entire hand above the wrist.

13
After each condition the researcher asked the participant to rate their pain on a 11-point
scale (0= no pain sensation) to 10 (most intense pain sensation imaginable). The researcher
entered all their response into Qualtrics. Participants then completed an online survey of
demographic information and read and signed a debriefing form.
GSR measures were recorded continuously throughout the study, beginning shortly
before the baseline condition and ending approximately twenty seconds after the conclusion of
the second water condition. The values used in analysis were sampled from the thirty to fifty
second mark, as well as the final forty-five seconds of each condition. These periods represent
the times when the participant is listening to the end of each dilemma and processing their
response, ideally periods of the condition with the highest WM load. During recording, any
movements by the participant were noted, and a two second segment of the GSR readings
removed from the relevant

Utilitarian Response Rates
measurement periods to account for
1.2
Sum of utilitarian responses

the resulting fluctuations in GSR.
1

After cleaning, GSR levels were
0.8

averaged over these two periods to

0.6
0.4

represent peak levels during their

0.2

respective conditions.

0
Baseline

WM

Warm

Cold

Condition

Results
After completion of the

Figure 1 - Comparison of utilitarian response rates
experiment, the collated data was
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recoded for analysis. In each condition, participant responses to the two provided dilemmas
coded as a “1” or a “0”, indicating a utilitarian response or a non-utilitarian response
respectively (0 = “Not Appropriate to kill” and 1 = “Appropriate to kill”). The paired dilemmas
were then summed and graded on a 0-2 score indicating overall rate of utilitarian response.
A Friedman test revealed a significant effect of Condition (Baseline, Working
Memory(WM), Warm Water, and Cold Water(Pain)) on the total number of Utilitarian
responses: χ2(3) = 45.495, p < 0.001. A Wilcoxon Signed Ranks test was used for post-hoc
analyses. The Baseline condition produced significantly more Utilitarian responses than the WM
condition (Z = -2.332, p = 0.02), Warm Water condition (Z = -4.677, p < 0.001), and Cold Water
condition (Z = -5.733, p < 0.001). There were significantly more Utilitarian responses in the WM
condition compared to the Warm Water condition (Z = -2.874, p = 0.004) and the Cold Water
condition (Z = -3.165, p = 0.002). No

Mean GSR Measures
significant difference was found
6

between the Cold and Warm Water
conditions (Z = -7.45, p = 0.457).
Image 1 illustrates the
relative rates of utilitarian response
between conditions. It should be
noted that while an effect by the cold

Micro-Siemens (μS)

5
4
3
2
1
0
Baseline

condition was predicted, the

WM

Warm

Condition

directionality of the observed effect
was contrary to that of the

Figure 2 - Comparison of mean GSR measures

Cold
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hypothesis. Furthermore, the hypothesis did not predict the presence of an effect in the Warm
Water condition.
Analysis of the GSR measures recorded throughout the study concluded by repeated
measures ANOVA that neither the Cold Water (F(1,115) = 0.991, p = 0.322), (M = 2.48, STD =
6.16) nor the Warm Water (F(1,115) = 0.009, p = 0.927), (M = 5.13, STD = 5.03) conditions
showed any significant differences in skin conductance from the established Baseline (M = 2.05,
STD = 4.01). There were, however, significantly elevated GSR readings observed in the
Working Memory condition (M = 5.13, STD = 5.03), which was shown to be higher on average
than both the Baseline, (F(1,115) = 112.46, p ,0.001) and the two water conditions (F(1,115) =
55.27, p < 0.001), (F(1,115) = 76.44, p < 0.001).
In contrast with the previous analysis, comparison of GSR readings both failed to support
the hypothesized difference between the Cold Water condition and the Baseline. Additionally,
there was an unexpected difference between the Baseline and Working Memory conditions.
While there was no initial expectation of differences in GSR measures between the Warm Water
and Baseline conditions, the lack of differentiation between Warm and Cold Water conditions
was also unexpected.
A repeated measures ANOVA was conducted on participants’ pain ratings (0-10 scale).
The findings confirmed that there was a significant difference between pain ratings across the
four conditions (Baseline, Working Memory, Warm Water/Cold Water): F(3,357) = 25.32, p <
.001, η2p = .18. Post-hoc analyses (Bonferroni corrected) indicated that only the Cold Water
condition was significantly different from any other condition (p < .05). After concluding that
participants were experiencing significantly heightened pain levels under the Cold Water
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condition, a secondary analysis was conducted using an independent–samples t-test to compare
appropriateness to kill scores (utilitarian decisions) in the cold condition only. Participants were
divided into No Pain (pain ratings of 0; n=71) and High Pain (pain ratings of 5-10; n=21)
subcategories. There was a significant difference in moral decision making between the pain
conditions: t (90) = -9.57, p < .001). Participants who experienced no pain were more likely than
those in high pain to decide that it is appropriate to kill. Meanwhile, in those reporting higher
levels of pain, indicating higher utilitarianism.

Discussion
These results are in support of the theory that pain stimuli can induce state-based changes
in moral reasoning, though it is clear that these effects are more in nature. Contrary to the
hypothesis of this study, utilitarian decision making appears to decrease under the influence of a
nociceptive stimuli, rather than increasing. In addition, as both the Warm Water and Cold Water
conditions induced lowered rates of utilitarian response, pain does not appear to be the only
factor in the observed decreases in rates, though secondary analysis supported higher levels of
pain as more effective in shifting patterns of decision making.
The first effect of interest is shown by the comparison of utilitarian response rates
between conditions. Initially, it was proposed that utilitarian decision making would increase
under the effects of pain as a result of moral reasoning acting as a theorized third contender for
working memory resources alongside the pain stimulus and the decision making task. The
increased WM load would then, hypothetically, lead to the suppression of the moral input and
prioritization of the less complex comparison of which provided outcome would result in the
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greatest number of survivors. This rested on the assumption that, in the case of overtaxed WM
resources, the theoretically more simple type of calculative decision making would be prioritized
and lead to higher rates of utilitarian response. However, the results of this analysis indicate that
the opposite is the case. In no condition did utilitarian decision making increase over the
established baselines rates, thoroughly discrediting this initial hypothesis.
Focusing first on the noted differences between the Baseline and Cold Water conditions
before further discussion of the overarching patterns suggested by these results, the evidence that
utilitarian decision making decreases with the addition of a pain stimulus required consideration.
The apparent complications in the results should not detract from the support for this
relationship. The basis for this relationship, however, is apparently different than originally
proposed. Considering the pattern of results, namely the lack of consistent GSR differences
between pain and non-pain conditions, physiological sources of influence can be summarily
dismissed. The medium of interaction between pain and moral reasoning appears then to be
working memory.
A cognitive relationship between our variables of interest is not unexpected, despite the
surprising directionality of the results. Moral reasoning's reliance on working memory resources
made it plausible that changes in performance would take place under sufficient WM load, but
the considerable decrease in utilitarian response indicates that the nature of morality in working
memory is not as clear-cut as initially proposed. If increased WM load during a moral decision
making task leads to decreases in utilitarian response, it can be assumed that reaching a
utilitarian decision requires greater available WM resources than does reaching a non-utilitarian
decision. One suggested explanation for this discrepancy in expected WM load is that moral
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reasoning may represent a more efficient method of reaching a conclusion than the weighing to
options in a utilitarian manner. This would parallel other WM-LTM interactive pathways in
which semantic memory is used to lighten the processing load on working memory and
streamline the task at hand. If this is the case in moral reasoning, it could be that, when under
conditions that increase WM load, participants are relying on more automatic or dogmatic
semantically influenced reasoning rather than pure utilitarian processing, the result being less
utilitarian choices overall. Another explanation can be drawn from the Dual Process Theory,
which models deontological reasoning as a process that requires active suppression to perform
utilitarian decision making Greene et al., 2008). This suppression demands WM resources and is
inhibited by increased WM load, resulting in incomplete suppression of deontological reasoning
and a corresponding decrease in utilitarianism. In all likelihood, a full model would incorporate
elements from all three models, suggesting that moral decision-making requires attentionalreliant suppression of deontological efficiency systems to perform high utilitarian decision
making.
The second most notable area of discrepancy between the expected effects and those
noted in the results is the distinct decrease in utilitarian responses not only in the Cold Water
condition, but also in the Warm Water and, to a lesser extent, Working Memory conditions.
While the secondary analysis conducted within the Cold Water condition confirmed that
individuals reporting higher pain showed significantly lower utilitarian response rates than those
reporting no pain, there is clearly a more powerful source of influence present than that of pain
alone. With no pain reported in the Warm Water condition, it is strongly suggested that
attentional or WM load related effects are the predominant cause of the reduction in utilitarian

19
response, though it remains surprising that the supposedly minor influences of the Warm Water
condition represented a sufficiently strong demand on WM resources as to be comparable to the
Cold Water condition. It would appear that directing attention away from the moral reasoning
can be effectively achieved with a simple physical stimulus, rather than requiring the processing
of a nociceptive effect. The implications here are interesting. It was the goal of this study to
show the presence or absence of state-based influences on moral reasoning, and in that it has
handily succeeded. However, for moral reasoning to shift predictably to such a degree with so
little a stimulus suggests that in real-world applications of these findings, any redirection of
attention may result in lower degrees of utilitarian researching. Considering the settings to which
it was argued that these findings could apply, it would be difficult to avoid the need to redirect
attention in such crisis situations.
Turning attention next to the implications of the GSR analysis, it becomes immediately
apparent that little to none of the observed changes in decision making can be reasonably
attributed to the influence of sympathetic activation. Had an autonomic response been
responsible for the observed changes in rates of utilitarian response, a predictable increase in
GSR should have been observable in any condition in which decision making patterns were
affected. The absence of such a pattern indicates a negligible impact by autonomic activation on
decision making across the experiment. More curious is the presence of elevated GSR readings
during the Working Memory condition, as the expected source of higher GSR was sympathetic
activation due to pain. As the pain condition did not differ from the recorded baseline, it can be
assumed that this elevated response is not the result of pain. If this response is due to cognitive
strain, it does not adequately explain why, if the Working Memory condition caused the greatest
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WM load, the condition did not show a lower score than either the Warm or Cold Water
conditions. The more likely, if unfortunate, explanation is that while the Cold and Warm Water
conditions were counterbalanced to ensure the order of the experiment did not confound the
findings, the Baseline and Working Memory conditions were always conducted first. This
suggests that the results are showing an increasing level of participant stress at the beginning of
the experiment, followed by decreasing levels throughout the latter half, the measurable nature of
which is masked by the counterbalanced design. Regardless, the lack of differentiation in GSR
between the Cold Water and Baseline conditions indicates that physiological effects are unlikely
to be the root of the observed changes in decision making.
The final analysis elaborated on the change in decision making observed in the Cold
Water condition in an attempt to clarify the apparent lack of effect by pain on moral reasoning.
With the Warm Water condition indicating the same functional decrease in utilitarianism as the
Cold Water condition, the complete lack of influence by the nociceptive stimulus suggested by
the primary analysis was unexpected. Differentiating participants who, in the Cold Water
condition, experienced high levels of pain versus those who experienced none indicated a
distinction between the groups in terms of utilitarian response, with those who experience high
pain ranking significantly lower in utilitarianism. It must be noted that, as this is a correlation
between the two variables rather than an indication of causation on the part of the pain stimulus.
The possibility remains that individuals with high pain thresholds are inherently more likely to
respond along utilitarian parameters for reasons currently unexplored. However, in light of the
effect by what appears to be cognitive load in both conditions, it does not seem unreasonable to
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assume that while non-nociceptive WM load may comprise some or most of the noted effect,
pain does represent a further increase in WM load with similar effects.
Limitations
As discussed above, though the Cold Water and Warm Water conditions were
appropriately counterbalanced, the Baseline condition, as well as the Working Memory
condition, were conducted in the same order at the beginning of each trial. This oversight may
explain the noted increase in GSR during the Working Memory condition, as the possibility
remains that participants had an overall increase in stress at the beginning of the study, followed
by a subsequent decline. Casual observation of the GSR readouts appears to support this
argument, as the majority do not show clear distinction between conditions, instead following a
steady arc.
A similar concern with methodology was the execution of the cold pressor task.
Literature indicates that when inducing pain by cold pressor, the water should be circulated to
ensure that the entire basin maintains a constant, low temperature (Michelle, MacDonald, &
Brodie, 2004). Without this circulating element, while the technique can certainly induce pain,
there is concern that a “bubble” of warmer water will form around the participant’s hand due to
body heat. The result is a pocket of warmer water around the hand and a subsequently reduced
pain stimulus. This may account for why the Cold Water and Warm Water conditions were so
similar in terms of effect on moral decision making. As the period of the GSR recording from
which the sample for each condition fell at the end of the section so as to capture the time span
during which the participant was processing the presented dilemma, this may also have given the
water around the participant’s hand sufficient time to warm above the expected temperature. The
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secondary analysis concluded that higher ratings of pain intensity predicted lower average
utilitarianism, which may be an indication that, had the pain induction equipment been a more
reliable nociceptive stimulus, there would be a significant differentiation in utilitarian responses
between the Warm and Cold Water conditions.
Future Directions
A potential direction in which this line of investigation could be expanded would be to
compare moral decision making along an axis other than utilitarianism, or to otherwise subdivide
and modify the types of dilemma presented. Examining the differences in strength of effect
between personal and impersonal moral dilemmas would further strengthen the body of evidence
for state-based effects on moral reasoning. Similarly, as the strongest effects appear to be due to
the increased WM load, rather than the presence of a nociceptive effect, elaboration on what
types of WM task most strongly influence moral decision making could lead to a more clear
impression of how moral reasoning is loaded into WM memory and to what interferences it is
most susceptible.
Finally, while this study is not, at present, concerned with the effects of long-term
chronic pain on moral decision making, the implication that acute pain influences moral
reasoning through WM channels may make these findings of interest to labs researching the
cognitive effects of chronic pain. Existing research indicates long-term degenerative effects of
chronic pain on cognitive functions, accompanied with physical changes in cortical thickness and
gray-matter volume (Borsook, Erpelding, & Becerra, 2013; Smallwood et al., 2013). If utilitarian
decision making is negatively impacted by the occupation of WM resources, more permanent
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decreases in WM capacity may show similar effects, indicating another potential cognitive
symptom of chronic pain that remains under-explored.

Conclusions
Despite unexpected findings, the results of this experiment strongly indicate the presence
of a state-based change in moral decision making as a result of increased working memory load.
Further investigation implies that both working memory load and pain stimuli result in decreases
in rates of utilitarian decision making, but the causal nature of the pain stimulus requires further
study to verify. While the original hypothesis was that utilitarian decision making would require
less WM resources than moral decision making, predicting increases in utilitarianism under the
pain stimulus, in no conditions did utilitarian decision making increase over levels recorded
during the Baseline condition. Instead, it appears that any increased cognitive load results in a
decrease in utilitarian judgement. This may indicate that moral reasoning acts as an efficiency
technique, allowing an individual to make decisions along dogmatic principles rather than
higher-load utilitarian reasoning, or it may be evidence that moral reasoning receives higher
prioritization than utilitarian reasoning when WM capacity is exceeded and attention is
maintained on the moral decision making task. In either case, the evidence supports the argument
that, under high stress or high stimulation conditions, moral reasoning is subject to state-based
influences that result in a decrease in utilitarian decision making.
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